Nous démontrons qu'uneéconomie d'échange (définie par ses préfé-rences et ses dotations) qui génère une fonction de demande excéden-taire aggrégée (DEA) z est proche de l'économie associéeà la DEA z , perturbation arbitraire de z.
Introduction
Genericity results -such as establishing that the set of equilibrium prices constitutes a manifold of a certain dimension or that the number of regular equilibria is finite and stable -are obtained by perturbation techniques, where the underlying primitives (e.g., preferences and endowments) are subjected to infinitesimal changes. Debreu's (1970) proof of local isolation of regular economies, for example, requires a perturbation of endowments. Extending the proof to critical economies requires additional effort: since the perturbation must also affect the curvature of the equilibrium manifold, a linear perturbation such as the one at the heart of Debreu's proof no longer suffices. An example of a higher-order perturbation is found in Mas-Colell (1985, Proposition 8.8.3), who shows that for a one-dimensional parameterization of economies, a "flat" AED is not generic in the first consumer's utility. It is instructive to note that Mas-Colell must resort not only to a perturbation of endowments, but also to a quadratic perturbation of (indirect) utility. Allen (1984) , on the other hand, establishes much more, namely, finiteness for multi-dimensional parameterizations of economies by employing a theorem by Tougeron (1972) , according to which local finiteness of the number of pre-images is a generic property of smooth functions. The result comes at a cost, however, in that Allen works directly with AED functions rather than with the agents' underlying preferences and endowments. In this note, we show that Allen's approach is fully justified.
Specifically, we establish that the economy, i.e., preferences and endowments, that generates a given AED function is close to the economy generating the AED obtained by an arbitrary perturbation the initial one.
1
We show that the Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu results (roughly, if it "looks" like an AED, it is an AED for some economy) are stable in the following sense: the economy underlying a perturbed AED function is necessarily close to the economy behind the original AED function. Moreover, the two economies differ (slightly) in the preferences and endowments of the first consumer only.
Part of the challenge, of course, is to show that perturbations of AED functions correspond to "legal" perturbations of preferences, i.e, perturbed utility functions must continue to satisfy the canonical properties of utility functions.
This opens wider the door to further genericity and determinacy research based on transversality arguments since one may now perturb the AED function directly thus sparing one the more tedious exercise of perturbing economic primitives.
In a companion paper, Castro and Dakhlia (2008) make full use of this result to establish Thom-Boardman stratification of AED, which requires high-order perturbations that would have been more difficult to obtain by conventional means. The stratification result, in turn, provides an alternative proof of finiteness of all equilibria, including critical ones.
Notation
Consider an economy with L commodities ( = 1, . . . , L) and I traders (i = 1, . . . , I). Let Ω be the non-negative orthant of R L and let each trader i be defined by her endowment ω i ∈ R L and her preferences i , a partial order on Ω with the following properties:
1. rationality (completeness, reflexivity, and transitivity) 2. continuity ({x : y i x} and {y : y i x} are open);
Let Ξ denote the space of all such preferences. Following Kannai (1970) , every i ∈ Ξ may be represented by a continuous utility function u i : Ω → R defined as follows: for any x ∈ Ω, there exists a uniquex in the principal diagonal of Ω such that x ∼ ix (i.e., agent i is indifferent between x andx). Then, let u i (x) ≡ x , where . is the Euclidean norm. Denote C * the class of utility functions thus defined. 2 Finally, we define a perturbation of preferences as preferences that are distinct but arbitrarily close to the original ones. Similarly, a perturbation of a utility function is defined as a distinct, but arbitrarily close, utility function.
Result
Any preference ordering can be represented by exactly one utility function in C * . Thus, perturbations of a C * -utility necessarily imply perturbations of the underlying preferences and vice-versa. Moreover, direct perturbations of AED correspond to perturbations of preferences and endowments.
The following lemmas show that a perturbation of preferences corresponds to a perturbation of utility, and vice-versa. Proof. Because u is close to u 0 , we know that for any compact subset K ⊂ Ω,
For u ∈ C * there exists a constant C, depending only on L = dimΩ, such that 0 ≤ u(x) < C x . (See Kannai and, in particular, his proof of Theorem
which converges to zero as x approaches infinity, that is,
Take K to be the compact set Cl(B R (0)), the closure of the ball of radius R about the origin. Therefore by definition,
Lemma 3.2. Consider preferences 0 ∈ Ξ represented by a utility function
Proof. We need to establish that for any compact subset K ⊂ Ω,
In light of these two lemmas, we can henceforth interchangeably work with preference and C * -utility perturbations, depending on which is more convenient.
We now turn to the excess demand of an agent endowed with ω i ∈ R L . Trader i solves Utility Maximization Problem (UMP)
Strict convexity of preferences ensures that the solution, x i (p, p·ω i ), is unique and a continuous function of both price vector p and endowment ω i . Nonsatiation guarantees that the budget constraint is binding and can thus be written as
Geometrically, the constraint is the hyperplane through ω i orthogonal to p, while the solution to the UMP corresponds to the point of tangency between the level curves of u i and the hyperplane. For smooth level curves, the point of tangency is located where ∇u i , the gradient of u i , is parallel to p. The excess demand for trader i is defined as
and the AED for the economy is given by
. The main result of this section, Theorem 3.2, establishes that a perturbation of AED is equivalent to a perturbation of economic primitives, that is, preferences and endowments. Note that, from the definition of AED, it suffices to consider the perturbation of the excess demand of a single consumer. We will thus drop the agent-specific superscript, when no confusion is possible.
We proceed by first establishing Theorem 3.1, which states that the perturbation of an agent's utility and endowment is equivalent to a perturbation of her excess demand. This will require a sequence of lemmas. Our main result (Theorem 3.2) then follows as a consequence of considering utilities in C * . Proof. The proof of part (I) is a consequence of the continuous dependence of demand on price, endowments and utility as proved in Lemma 3.3. Since strict convexity of preferences guarantees that x 0 (p) ≡ x 0 (p, p · ω) is a continuous function of ω, any perturbation of ω will correspond to a perturbation of x 0 (p). Lemma 3.3 shows that the same applies to perturbations of utility. To prove part (II), we show that a perturbation of the solution must originate in a perturbation of utility and/or endowments. It is here that we need the assumption of a twice-differentiable utility function. At the solution x 0 (p), the budget constraint (2) is tangent to the indifference curve containing x 0 , which means that the gradient of u at x 0 , ∇u(x 0 ), is orthogonal to p · (x − ω) = 0. As such, ∇u(x 0 ) is parallel to p.
Letx(p) be a perturbation of x 0 (p), say x − x 0 < δ for small δ > 0. Ifx does not satisfy the budget constraint, we perturb ω toω so that p · (x −ω) = 0. In addition, we shall chooseω so that the hyperplane described by p · (x −ω) = 0 is parallel to the original one. Denote the solution to the UMP defined by u and the new restriction by x 0 (p). We have Hence,x is also a perturbation of x 0 and we can henceforth suppose that the demand for the unperturbed problem andx belong to the same budget constraint, dropping the use of the prime.
It remains to show that we can perturb the utility so thatx(p) is the solution to the UMP.
Define Φ : Ω → Ω by
where ϕ : R → R is constant and equal to 1 for 0 ≤ t ≤ δ 1 , ϕ(t) is constant and equal to zero for t ≥ 2δ 1 and ϕ(t) is smooth and decreasing for δ 1 ≤ t ≤ 2δ for some constants A and B. We choose δ 1 so that δ < δ 1 in order to guarantee that ϕ( x − x 0 ) = 1. Clearly, Φ is the identity for x − x 0 ≥ 2δ 1 and a translation for x − x 0 ≤ δ 1 .
Defineū(x) = u(Φ(x)). We havē
and ∇ū(x) = ∇u(x 0 ) (see Lemma 3.4 below). The level hypersurface ofū at x is thus tangent to p · (x − ω) = 0 and hence,x is a solution to the UMP defined byū. Lemmas 3.5 and 3.6 below show thatū is increasing in x and that its indifference curves are convex, thus ensuring that the underlying preferences satisfy (1)-(4), thereby completing the proof.
Lemma 3.3. Let x be the unique solution to the UMP defined by a utility u and endowment ω. Then x is a continuous function of p, ω and u.
Proof. It is clear that x is a continuous function of p and ω. To prove continuity on u, we proceed by contradiction. Let u n be a sequence of utility functions such that as n → +∞, we have u n → u. Let x n = x n (p) be the unique maximum of u n on
Assume lim n→+∞ x n = x. By compactness of H(p, ω), we may assume that x n → x * = x n , passing to a subsequence if necessary.
Continuity of each utility in conjunction with the hypothesis that x n → x * implies that, for each fixed m ∈ N, we have
In particular,
Let d(u, u n ) < δ/3, that is, for all y ∈ K ⊂ Ω, a compact set also containing x and x * ,
In particular, replacing y as appropriate, we have
Using (4), we obtain
Since n ≥ M, in particular for n = M, we have
which is a contradiction because x M is the unique maximum of u M . Hence x * = x, proving that demand is a continuous function of utility. Proof. We use the definition ofū to calculate partial derivatives and obtain
and
Lemma 3.5. Let u andū be as defined in the proof of Theorem 3.1. Then u is increasing in each of its arguments.
Proof. From Lemma 3.4, we know that
Otherwise, x is in a compact (in the annular region bounded by the discs of radius δ 1 and 2δ 1 ) and ∂u ∂x j is bounded away from zero (as u is increasing in each of its arguments). Hence, by making the absolute value of Proof. From Thorpe [11] , we know that the normal curvature of a level hypersurface of a function u in the direction of a vector v ( v = 1) perpendicular to ∇u(x) is given by
where H u (x) is the Hessian of u at x and < v, H u (x)v > represents the quadratic form defined by H u (x) (see exercise 2.1 in [11] and section 2 of Gladiali and Grossi [5] ). Because the level curves of u are convex, we know that H u (x) is positive definite for all x. We show that the entries of Hū(x) are close to the entries of H u (Φ(x)). Hence,ū can be chosen so that Hū(x) is also positive definite.
By differentiating the first derivatives obtained in the proof of Lemma 3.4, we obtain
∂x k ∂x j depends on terms of the form (x − x 0 ) j . Note also that for x such that either 0 ≤ x − x 0 ≤ δ 1 or x − x 0 ≥ 2δ 1 , the derivatives of ϕ are zero (because ϕ is constant) and therefore, the second derivatives of u andū coincide. Since
is compact, the derivatives of u are bounded. We may then use our choice of δ < δ 1 to bound the remaining derivatives in the same way as in the proof of Lemma 3.5, so that the products involving derivatives of ϕ, and hence of Φ become small.
We can now state our main result. Proof. Choose utilities in C * to represent the preferences. Using Lemma 3.8, we can approximate these by C 2 utilities. Moreover, because of Lemmas 3.1 and 3.2, perturbations in utility correspond to perturbations in preferences and vice-versa. The result then follows from Theorem 3.1 and in a straightforward way from the definition of AED.
Note that the preferences represented by the C 2 utilities obtained through Theorem 3.1 can be described by utilities in C * .
In the proof of Lemma 3.8, we need the following: By monotonicity, L wt lies between L x and L w and f (w t ) > f(x). Since y λ ∈ L wt for some t, we have f (y t ) > f(x), concluding the proof.
Lemma 3.8. Let u ∈ C
* be a utility representing preferences that satisfy (1)- (4) . Endow C * with the uniform norm on compact sets. There existsū which is C 2 and close to u representing preferences that satisfy (1)- (4) .
